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Feminist Ethic of Care: A Third Alternative Approach
Els Maeckelberghe1,2
A man with Alzheimer’s who wanders around, a caregiver who disconnects the
alarm, a daughter acting on het own, and a doctor who is not consulted set the
stage for a feminist reflection on capacity/competence assessment. Feminist theory
attempts to account for gender inequality in the political and in the epistemolog-
ical realm. One of its tasks is to unravel the settings in which actual practices,
i.c. capacity/competence assessment take place and offer an alternative. In this
article the focus will be on a feminist ethics of care in which relationality, care,
vulnerability, and responsibility are privileged concepts and attitudes. The empha-
sis on these notions leads to a specific view of autonomy that has consequences
for both carereceivers (patients, clients) and caregivers (professional and not pro-
fessional). These concepts constitute a default setting that shapes the context for
capacity/competence assessment. Whereas this notion is meant to distinguish be-
tween those who need to be taken care of and those who do not, reflection on what
it means to say ‘those who need to be taken care of’ is also required. The feminist
analysis presented here emphasizes the necessity of the contextualization of assess-
ment of competence. It sketches the multifold and complex grid that comprehends
capacity assessment.
KEY WORDS: feminist; care ethics; responsibility; competence assessment.
INTRODUCTION
The presentation of Case A. suggests that different individuals participate
in the story of the 87-year-old man. It is not clear what their positions are. All
players, ‘the’ daughter, ‘the’ old man, ‘the’ doctor, ‘the’ nurse are anonymous and
no relation of equality or inequality, authority or domination is articulated. The
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9713 AV Groningen, The Netherlands.
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Fig. 1. Simple triangle.
scene evokes a triangle in which the old man is the object of decisions made by
others: his daughter or the professionals. These parties are portrayed as antagonistic
characters. Their caring activities have no context. The male caregiver who is
frequently disturbed by ringing alarm bells seems careless, but maybe his action
is set in a context of an understaffed unit where alarm bells have been a means of
downsizing staff.
All characters are set in an empty stage in which the daughter and the profes-
sionals are acting independently and are detached from any context. They can be
pictured in a clean chart (Fig. 1).
All decisions are made without input from the old man. His position is that of
the one who needs to be taken care of. This presentation is inspired by a particular
notion of autonomy in which self-determination is dominant. It is the common con-
ceptual denominator of different contemporary ideas of autonomy (an individual
right, a negative liberty, capacity for rational self-legislation). Free and individual
choice derives from this basic notion. When a person is unable to excercise this
self-determination, others take over. This explains the arrows in the chart, pointing
from the daughter towards the old man and from the professionals towards the
old man. The old man’s competence is questioned because he does not comply
with what his carers think he ought to do. The daughter and the professionals
have a double sided arrow as they are participating in some kind of conversa-
tion with each other in which both parties do not question each others mental
capacity.
FEMINIST ETHICS
What is the contribution of a feminist analysis to this case? In order to answer
this question, we need to make a sketch of what feminist ethics is about. Many
discussions about feminism, c.q. feminist ethics circle around the question how
to define it. Authors quickly point out that there is no such thing as ‘the feminist
standpoint’. Several approaches are outlined and historical overviews show the
diversity in time and scope (Warner, 2000). Susan Sherwin has drawn attention to
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some core notions that transcend the internal debates: “a recognition that women
are in subordinate position in society, that oppression is a form of injustice and
hence is intolerable, that there are further forms of oppression in addition to gender
oppression (and that there are women victimized by each of these forms of oppres-
sion), that it is possible to change society in ways that could eliminate oppression,
and that it is a goal of feminism to pursue the changes necessary to accomplish
this.’ (Sherwin, 1992:29 note 6) Commentators acknowledge that not all those who
call themselves feminist will comply with this description. The notion of ‘woman’
for example will be contested by post-modernists. However, as Donchin and Purdy
acutely observe, there are practical, political and philosophical reasons for accept-
ing core feminism. (Donchin, 1999) In identifying what feminism is about, it might
lose some of the ‘dirty’ connotations, e.g. man hating, bra burning, it has received
over the last decades. Furthermore, it helps bridging the gap towards other justice
movements. Finally, naming core feminism clarifies what feminist theorizing in
its attempt at reconstructing theory and practice is about.
Feminist ethics is part of a larger project of feminist theory that ‘attempts
to account for gender inequality in the socially constructed relationship between
power—the political—on the one hand and the knowledge of truth and reality—
the epistemological—on the other’ (MacKinnon, 1987:147). It deals with theory
because fundamental concepts have been shaped in subtle ways by gender under-
standings and as such frame the way in which perception, conceptualization, and
valuation take place (Little, 1999).
In this article, I will focus on an ethic of care as a particular form of feminist
ethics (Tronto, 1993; Feder Kittay, 1999; Urban Walker, 1998). I will show how
this approach identifies relationality, care, vulnerability, and responsibility as priv-
ileged concepts and attitudes. The emphasis on these notions leads to a specific
view of autonomy that has consequences for both carereceivers (patients, clients)
and caregivers (professional and not professional). These concepts constitute a de-
fault setting that shapes the context for capacity/competence assessment. Whereas
this notion is meant to distinguish between those who need to be taken care of
and those who do not (Silberfeld, 1999), reflection on what it means to say “those
who need to be taken care of” is required. Ethics of care is “an ethical orientation
highlighting concrete and nuanced perception and understanding—including an
attunement to the reality of other people and to the actual relational contexts we
find ourselves in. (. . . ) (Care ethics) asserts the importance of an active concern
for the good of others and of community with them, of a capacity for sympathetic
and imaginative projection into the position of others, and of situation-attuned
responses to others’ needs.” (Carse, 1995:10) Care ethics turns the attention to the
interdependency and vulnerability of human existence. Central idea is the rela-
tional self who is connected with others. Care ethics takes the central activity of
caring seriously. It is a feminist ethics because it ‘refuses to permit a value like
caring to “trap” women by requiring them, but not men, to tend others’ (Tong,
1999:34).
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FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN ETHICS OF CARE
Caring is by its very nature a challenge to the notion that individuals are
entirely autonomous and self-supporting. A general definition of care is suggested
by Tronto and Berenice Fisher: ‘On the most general level, we suggest that caring
be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain,
continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That
world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek
to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web’ (Tronto, 1993:103). Caring is
an ongoing practice and disposition which is largely defined culturally and will
vary among different cultures. The definition seems all-encompassing. However,
not all human activity is caring: it only deserves that title when it is aimed at
maintaining, continuing, or repairing the world. It is an activity starting from the
concerns and needs of the other which is the basis for action. Care involves some
form of ongoing connection. ‘But one reason to presume that we are all inde-
pendent and autonomous is to avoid the difficult questions that arise when we
recognize that not al humans are equal. Inequality gives rise to unequal relation-
ships of authority, and to domination and subordination. No society exists without
such relationships, but neither can democratic order thrive when such inequalities
exist’ (Tronto, 1993:135). This is a challenge a feminist ethic of care wants to
address.
A well-accomplished act of care is described by the four phases of care: (1)
caring about; (2) taking care of; (3) care-giving; (4) care-receiving. Caring about
refers to the recognition that care is necessary; taking care of is about assuming
some responsibility for the identified need and determining how to respond to
it; care-giving describes the direct meeting of needs for care; and care-receiving
invokes the experiences connected with receiving care. This process corresponds
with specific moral skills and attitudes. Caring about presumes an attitude of atten-
tiveness. Attentive presence prevents caregivers from buying into what is so-called
self-evident. Acts once done tend to sneak into caring activities and become habits,
thereby loosing sight of the real needs of the carereceiver. A man with dementia
is labeled a run-away while his real needs might be physical activity. He has been
married to his wife for ages but nobody seems to wonder whether she might be
able to verbalize his real needs. Attentiveness implies breaking through one’s own
habits and presuppositions and mapping the real desiderata of the carereceiver.
Taking care of is connected with taking and charting responsibility. It is
the result of collective activities of different caregivers. They take the burden of
care on their shoulders and act accordingly. Cooperation between different fields
of responsibilities remains a difficult field. Power relations between for instance
nurses and doctors may hinder good care. The doctor in the case is not amused
when the daughter ‘takes care’ of her father without consulting him. Mapping
responsibilities can be strenuous as responsibility is embedded in a set of implicit
cultural practices. One is not aware of tacit expectations but acts according to them.
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The third phase in the caring process connects to the skill of competence:
intending to provide care, even accepting responsibility for it, but then failing to
provide good care, means that in the end the need for care is not met. Sometimes
care will be inadequate because the resources available to provide for care are
inadequate. Showing care implies that the work must be done competently. Care-
givers, for example lacking time to answer all alarm bells, cannot do their work
competently.
Care-receiving connects with the skill of responsiveness. This involves the
reactions to the care that is being offered. How well is the one needing care
responding? To be in a condition in which one needs care implies being in a position
of some vulnerability. Being attentive to the responsiveness of the carereceiver
demands being concerned with conditions of vulnerability and inequality. Analysis
of the unequal distribution of power is a necessary element of a caring attitude.
ATTENTIVENESS
This general description of care prepares some of the questions that must be
addressed in the case of the 87-year-old man. At first glance (see Fig. 1), the old
man, who remains nameless in the description, is surrounded by people and struc-
tures that answer his needs: his daughter, the municipal home and its personnel,
and the geriatric clinic. I will focus mainly on attentiveness as a necessary skill
for attaining an adequate description of the situation. “The insistence on acute
and loving perception as a central moral virtue highlights the need for seeing
more carefully what is and imagining more responsibly and creatively what might
be important for our lives as a community as well as our lives as individuals.”
(Lindemann Nelson and Lindemann Nelson, 1999:290). Assessment of capacities
is always done in a specific situation; therefore description of the situation must
be done carefully. The terms, in which the scene is portrayed, prepares the way in
which the discussion will develop.
The relational approach favoured by an ethic of care is critical of the dom-
inant notion of autonomy sketched before for it is fundamentally individualistic
and rationalistic (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Terms like freedom and individual
choice are multi-interpretable. Is a woman’s wish to care for her dementing father
her free and individual choice, or is it required by her culture, her surroundings, or
her religion? It seems that neither daughter nor father can be seen as isolated from
each other nor from the culture they are part of. Attention for the family as a legiti-
mate locus of the individual, in contrast with the view of the family as hindrance to
professionals, is an important shift from general perceptions (Lindemann Nelson
and Lindemann Nelson, 1995).
The image of an autonomous person reflecting, in splendid isolation, upon
the kind of life she wants to lead and the actions she wants to perform whenever
she is confronted with other human beings, deciding about the course of action she
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Fig. 2. Social relation.
will follow and adhering to the idea that she is master (sic) over herself clearly is a
caricature. Some theories about autonomy—and even more so the watered down
versions in actual practices—tend to accept the image of the solitary individual
who pursues an independent life course. Linda Barclay for instance warns us
for a purely procedural notion of autonomy that says it ‘consist of a capacity, or
the exercise of certain competencies, that enables one to reflect on one’s aims,
aspirations, and choose one’s ends and purposes through such a reflective process’
(Barclay, 2000:53).
The autonomous person envisaged in this procedural notion transcends all
embeddedness in a specific community or the indebtedness to the social relations
that constitute who one is. The individual is presented as a closed box with
deliberative capacities. This procedural notion of autonomy denies the social
influences on the self. It neglects the effects of others and social structures and
systems on who we are (Fig. 2).
“Who we are—what we are like and how we think and act—is significantly
influenced by social systems of domination and subordination.” (Tietjens Meyers,
2000:153). How a carereceiver will act and think is influenced by his position, his
personal life history and how that is guided and directed by the social circumstances
in which he lives. The setting in which he receives care will be one of the fac-
tors that decides on his autonomy. “Autonomy works in situ, and autonomous
individuals must work with whatever material is at hand” (Tietjens Meyers,
2000: 159) (Fig. 3).
Autonomy competency is not something we own, but something we develop,
over and over again, in dialogue with others. It is a continuing process in which
new situations force people to review what they value and how they want to lead
their lives. People reach autonomy in juggling around the material that is handed
over to them in specific situations. Most people have some idea about the direction
of their lives and usually they do not take steps that diverge tremendously from the
direction their lives took before. Most people have been—unconsciously—trained
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Fig. 3. Autonomy in situ.
in developing their own identity and autonomy in relation to others. This implies
that for instance in the setting of health care, patients, clients use the caregiver as
a mirror in order to check whether the direction they want to go into is not deviant
from whom they want to be.
Donchin characterizes autonomy as relational with reciprocity and collabo-
rativeness as its main features (Donchin, 2000:239). Becoming autonomous is a
delicate play between interdependent subjects who are involved in lives that some-
times meet and influence each other. “Our autonomy competency is a debt we owe
to others” (Barclay, 2000:58). This implies that those others play an important
role in enabling people to become autonomous, a role that can be characterized as
collaborative. They will have to act accordingly.
The feminist approach as presented here favours a shift in perspective. The
main question is not: how competent or autonomous is this person but how can
we enable this woman or man in attaining autonomy and consequently how can
we advance her competency in excercising autonomy? A switch is made from the
so-called incompetent carereceiver to the caregiver who is one of the actors in sup-
porting, promoting, and fostering the carereceiver. As a consequence, assessment
of competence will not only be directed at this particular persons whose compe-
tence is in doubt, it will also focus on what means are being used in order to enhance
someones competence. Competence assessment is being contextualized in that the
context can diminish ones abilities to excercise ones competence. “The capacity to
make an acceptable choice with respect to a specific decision” (Weisstub, 1990) is
not only an ability of one person, it is an ability enhanced or reduced by the context
in which it is excercised. The idea that “decision-making capacity is now generally
defined in terms of functional abilities to understand information relevant to a de-
cision, and to appreciate the consequences of the presenting options” (Silberfeld,
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1999:378), is modified by a feminist account. A feminist reading of ‘functional
abilities’ will not only look at the person having these abilities. It challenges the
surrounding environment and its actors to explain how it improves or hinders the
competence of this particular person.
MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS
The caring process with its connected moral skills as described by Tronto
and the notion of relational autonomy following from a feminist analysis of the
concept, add up to reflection on the position of the caregivers. A caregiver will
need to develop moral skills to avoid the pitfall of undesirable paternalism that
can permeate assessment of capacity. It demands a carer who has achieved some
lucidity about her own moral understandings of the kind of live she wants to lead,
what it means to be continuously involved in the process of acquiring competency
skills, and what it means to be a professional who as professional is involved in
helping other people labouring on their competency skills. Caregivers who are able
to reflect on their own moral understandings know what they are doing when they
are assessing someone else.
Transparency is the capacity to reflect on one’s own moral understandings so
that they do not impede the professional in her work but rather facilitate her in shed-
ding light on the values the client honours. In feminist perspective transparency for
instance visualizes gendered arrangements pervading structures of authority and
ascription of responsibilities (Urban Walker, 1998). The caregivers’ professional
identity and activity is formed by the practices she is enrolled in, the institutional
setting in which those practices take place, the society that supports those institu-
tions, and other settings she is part of. Professionals ought to be able to map their
own responsibilities as they are shaped by these practices and situate their clients
and their families in this complex field. The female doctor who is asked about
restraining measures for an 87 year-old man reacts differently whether this man
is her patient or whether this man is her father. As a doctor she is shaped by the
expectations of the group she belongs to: she is supposed to be a professional who
has found the delicate balance between emotional involvement and professional
distance with her patients. Being a female doctor in the still predominantly male
setting of the world of health care, she monitors the aspect of emotional involve-
ment very carefully. As a daughter, the balance is very different. Being a daughter
is no natural given; it is a position that is formed through historical and cultural
elements, class and colour. In her role as daughter, the environment expects her to
be especially emotionally involved. Too much distanced professional involvement
would make her seem hard and not caring.
Attentive and responsible care demands a good analysis of the situation at
hand. Assessment of capacities is always situated in a complex context that is
imbued with relations of vulnerability and dependence. A careful mapping of
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Fig. 4. Competence framework.
responsibilities (Urban Walker, 1998) and power relations will chart the framework
in which people’s competence is formed (Fig. 4).
CONCLUSION
The ethics of care perspective as briefly introduced here,3 offers an analysis
of the context in which capacity assessment takes place. Whilst figure 1 seemed to
offer a straightforward scene, Figure 4 portrays a complex stage that precludes any
straightforward model of evaluation of competence. The case presented at first does
not seem to ask any questions about whether the old man’s mental capacities ought
to be assessed or not. He is portrayed as a person who seems totally incompetent
and his behaviour, wandering around, ‘escapes’, not staying in bed, completes this
picture. A mapping of the situation in which this happens presents a scenario in
which the old man is situated within a specific context and in which he is related
to a number of people. They set the stage for any need of an assessment of the
competence of the old man. It is possible to imagine a situation where the old man
can actively live a life of wandering (after all, he has been physically active for all
3The sketch offered here is partial, for more reading, see the references.
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of his life) and nightly activity.4 Whether this is possible is not most prominently a
question of how competent he is, but a question about the setting and the limitations
this setting brings forth. The above feminist analysis emphasizes the necessity of
the contextualization of assessment of competence. It sketches the multifold en
complex grid that comprises capacity assessment.
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